This paper studies optimal auction design in a private value setting with endogenous information acquisition. First, we develop a general framework for modeling information acquisition when a seller wants to sell an object to one of several potential buyers who can each gather information about their valuations prior to participation. We then show that under certain conditions, standard auctions with a reserve price remain optimal, but the optimal reserve price lies between the mean valuation and the standard reserve price in Myerson (1981) . We provide sufficient conditions under which the value of information to the seller is positive, and also characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions under which equilibrium information acquisition in private value auctions is socially excessive. The key to the analysis is the insight that buyer incentives to acquire information become stronger as the reserve price moves toward the mean valuation. 
Introduction
The efficient use of information dispersed in society is, as Hayek (1945) emphasized, a fundamental issue in economics, and one that has been the focus of important research in mechanism design. A typical assumption in the literature is that the information held by market participants is exogenous; yet in many real world situations, agents' information about the goods and services being traded is acquired rather than endowed. 1 When information acquisition is endogenous, the selling mechanism proposed by the seller affects not only buyers' incentives to reveal the information they gathered ex post, but also their incentives to acquire information ex ante. Not surprisingly, if the information structure is endogenous, the ex post optimal selling mechanism, such as the one characterized in Myerson (1981) , may not be optimal ex ante.
The purpose of this paper is to study how a seller should design the selling mechanism when information acquisition is endogenous and costly for buyers. We first develop a convenient but fairly general framework to model information acquisition in an independent private value setting, where a seller wants to sell an object to one of several potential buyers and where the buyers can each covertly acquire information about their valuations. In the model, a buyer acquires information by increasing the precision of the signal he receives, and after receiving this each buyer forms a posterior estimate of his valuation which will depend on both the realization and the informativeness of his signal in the following way: buyer valuation estimates in a private value setting move apart as more information is acquired, i.e., the distribution of posterior estimates conditional on a more informative signal is more spread out. 2 The resulting family of distributions of the posterior estimates with different signals are rotation-ordered 3 -the information order we use to rank the informativeness of signals.
We apply this framework to analyze monopoly pricing and optimal auction design with endogenous information acquisition. Since an increase in information leads to an increase in the dispersion of buyers' valuation estimates, increased information acquisition has two competing effects on the 1 For example, consumers collect information about the characteristics of products and match this information with their private preferences to determine their valuations before their purchase decision. In a take-over bidding, buyers gather costly information about potential syergies between their own assets and assets of the target firm to determine how much they should bid.
2 For example, suppose a consumer tries a newly opened restaurant and finds the food spicy. He will like the restaurant more if he loves spicy food, and he will like the restaurant less if he dislikes spicy food.
3 If two signals are rotation-ordered, then the two distributions of posterior estimates generated by these signals cross each other only once. The rotation order was recently introduced by Johnson and Myatt (2006) in order to model how advertising, marketing and product design affect the dispersion of consumers' valuations and lead to a rotation (rather than a shift) of the market demand curve.
The same observation can be extended to a general setting with many buyers and rotationordered information structures. But the analysis of the general model is more subtle and complicated, primarily because the optimal selling mechanism no longer admits the simple form of a posted price. Rather, a feasible mechanism has to provide buyers with the right incentives to collect information in the information acquisition stage (moral hazard) and be incentive compatible in the information revelation stage (adverse selection). We use the standard first-order approach to tackle the moral hazard problem, replacing the information acquisition constraints by the firstorder conditions of the buyers' maximization problems (Mirrlees (1999) , and Rogerson (1985) ). 8
Our problem here is complicated because more information may hurt or benefit the seller, while in the standard moral hazard problem, the principal always benefits from higher effort (without accounting for the incentive cost of inducing higher effort).
In order to identify the seller's information preference, we focus for tractability on the symmetric equilibrium in which all buyers acquire the same level of information. Given that buyers are ex ante symmetric, this restriction is quite natural because symmetric mechanisms are easier to implement and are less likely to cause legal disputes. 9 Using Rogerson's technique, we show that the value of information to the seller is positive when the number of bidders is not too small. Then we show that standard auctions 10 with a reserve price are optimal, but the reserve price has to be adjusted toward the mean valuation to induce buyers to acquire more information. Further, the buyers' incentives to collect information are socially excessive in standard auctions with a reserve price lower than the mean valuation. 11
In sum, our analysis makes it clear that endogenous information pushes down the price level in a monopoly pricing setting. We also show that the optimal mechanisms identified in Myerson (1981) are robust to endogenous information acquisition if buyers are induced to acquire the same level of information in equilibrium. This implies that the seller can still use standard auctions to allocate the object as long as she appropriately adjusts the reserve price to incorporate buyer incentives 8 A condition, analogous to CDFC in Rogerson (1985) , is shown to be sufficient for the first-order approach to be valid when the support of buyers' posterior estimates is invariant to buyers' information choices. See Appendix B in an early version of the paper (Shi (2007) ) for a set of sufficient conditions under which the first-order approach is valid. 9 Nevertheless, this is an important restriction. In principle, the seller may become better off by implementing an asymmetric equilibrium rather than a symmetric one. 10 In this paper, we use standard auctions to refer to the four commonly used auction formats: first-price sealed-bid auctions, Vickery auctions, English auctions, and Dutch auctions.
11 As a robustness check, Subsection 5.3 studies the optimal (asymmetric) selling mechanism in a setting with discrete information acquisition. We dispense with both the first-order approach and the symmetric restriction on equilibrium information choices, and show that the rule of adjusting reserve price still holds.
to acquire information. The general framework we develop to model information acquisition in a private value setting can also apply to mechanism design problems when agents can make investment prior to the auction. For instance, Lichtenberg (1988) finds strong evidence of private R&D investment prior to government procurement auctions. In this vein, our framework can be used to investigate how the government should design procurement auctions in order to promote private R&D investment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature, Section 3 introduces the model, and Section 4 studies optimal auctions with a single bidder and the Gaussian specification. Section 5 then presents the analysis of optimal auctions with many bidders, and Section 6 concludes. All omitted proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Related Literature
This paper is related to the growing literature on information and mechanism design, extending the principal-agent model with information acquisition to a multi-agent setting. 12 Cremer and Khalil (1992) and Rochet (1998a) (1998b) introduce endogenous information acquisition into the Baron and Myerson (1982) regulation model, and illustrate how the optimal contract has to be modified in order to give the agent incentives to acquire information. Szalay (2007) extends their framework to a setting with continuous information acquisition, and demonstrates that their findings are robust. Our model shares a similar information structure and a focus on the interim participation constraint, though we incorporate strategic interactions among bidders.
Our analysis is also related to studies on information acquisition in given auctions. Matthews (1984) studies information acquisition in a common value auction and investigates whether the equilibrium price fully reveals bidders' information. Stegeman (1996) shows that first and second price auctions with independent private values result in the same incentives for information acquisition, while Persico (2000) shows that the incentive to acquire information is stronger in the first-price auction than in the second-price auction if bidders' valuations are affiliated. 13 In contrast, the current paper studies the optimal mechanism that maximizes the seller's revenue, rather than studying information acquisition under given auction formats. 14 A third strand of related literature studies optimal auctions when the seller controls either the access to information sources or the timing of information acquisition. The information order 12 For a broad survey of the literature on information and mechanism design, see Bergemann and Välimäki (2006a) . 13 See Ye (2007) and Compte and Jehiel (2007) for an analysis of information acquisition in dynamic auctions. 14 Bergemann and Välimäki (2002) also study information acquisition and mechanism design, but their focus is efficient mechanisms.
used in the present paper, the rotation order, was first introduced by Johnson and Myatt (2006) .
They use it to show that a firm's profits are a U-shaped function of the dispersion of consumers'
valuations, so a monopolist will pursue extreme positions, providing either a minimal or maximal amount of information. Eso and Szentes (2007) study optimal auctions in a setting where the seller controls the access to information sources. They show that the seller will fully reveal her information and can extract all of the benefit from the released information. 15 In these models, the seller makes the information decision, rather than the buyers.
Several papers study the optimal selling mechanism in a setting where buyers make the information decision, but the seller controls the timing of information acquisition. These models (hereafter referred to as "entry models") impose an ex-ante participation constraint, so the buyers' information decision is essentially an entry decision. The optimal selling mechanism typically consists of a participation fee followed by a second price auction with no reserve price, with the participation fee being equal to the bidders' expected rent from attending the auction (see for example, Levin and Smith (1994) and Ye (2004) ). 16
In contrast to these papers where information acquisition is centralized in the sense that the seller can control either access to information sources or the timing of information acquisition, information acquisition in the current paper is decentralized : buyers make the information decision, and can acquire information prior to participation. Thus, we impose an interim rather than an ex-ante participation constraint. 17 The relationship between our model and the existing literature can be partially summarized in the following table.
given auction formats mechanism design approach centralized information acquisition optimal disclosure in auctions entry models decentralized information acquisition information acquisition in auctions our model {ω i : i = 1, ..., n} , unknown ex-ante, are independently drawn from a common distribution F with support [ω, ω] . F has a strict positive and differentiable density f and mean µ. A buyer with valuation ω i gets utility u i if he wins the object and pays t i :
The seller's valuation for the object is normalized to be zero.
Information Structure
Buyer i can acquire a costly signal s i about ω i , with s i ∈ [s, s] ⊆ R. Signals received by different buyers are independent. Buyer i acquires information by choosing a joint distribution of (s i , ω i ) from a family of joint distributions
corresponds to a statistical experiment, and the signal with higher α i is more informative in a sense to be defined later. We refer to the joint distribution G α i , or simply α i , as the information structure.
The cost of performing an experiment α i is C (α i ) , which is convex in α i and twice continuously differentiable. A buyer can conduct the experiment α at no cost, so α can be interpreted as the endowed signal. As is standard in the literature, we assume that information acquisition is a once-for-all decision.
Let G α i (·|ω i ) denote the prior distribution of signal s i conditional on ω i , and G α i (·|s i ) denote the posterior distribution of ω i conditional on s i . We use g α i (·|ω i ) and g α i (·|s i ) to denote the corresponding densities. A buyer who observes a signal s i from experiment α i will update his prior belief about ω i according to Bayes' rule. Let v i (s i , α i ) denote buyer i's revised estimate of ω i after performing experiment α i and observing s i :
To simplify notation, we use v i to denote v i (s i , α i ) , and use v to denote the n-vector (v 1 , ..., v n ) .
Occasionally, we also write v as (
Throughout the paper we assume that the densities {g α i (·|ω i )} have monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP), so that v i (s i , α i ) is increasing in s i , i.e., a higher s i leads to a higher posterior estimate, given the information choice α i (Milgrom (1981) 
For bidder i, different information choices {α i } lead to different distributions {H α i } . So choosing α i is equivalent to choosing an H α i from the family of distributions {H α i } . In what follows, we will extensively work with the posterior estimate v i and its distribution H α i .
Timing
The timing of the game is as follows: the seller first proposes a selling mechanism; after observing the mechanism, each buyer decides how much information to acquire; after the signals are realized, each buyer decides whether to participate; each participating buyer submits a report about his private information; and finally, an outcome, consisting of an allocation of the object and payments, is realized. Figure 1 The payoff structure, the timing of the game, the information structure {G α i } and distribution
F are assumed to be common knowledge. The solution concept is Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Mechanisms
In our setting, the buyer's private information is two-dimensional, consisting of the information choice α i and the realized signal s i . This suggests that the design problem here is multi-dimensional and could potentially be very complicated (see for example, Armstrong (1996) ). However, similar to Biais, Martimort, and Rochet (2002) and Szalay (2007) , one single variable, the posterior esti- We can thus invoke the Revelation Principle to focus on the direct revelation mechanisms
where q i (v) denotes the probability of winning the object for bidder i when the vector of report is v, and t i (v) denotes bidder i's corresponding payment. Let Q i (v i ) and T i (v i ) be the expected probability of winning and the expected payment conditional on v i , respectively. The interim utility of bidder i who has a posterior estimate v i and reports v i is A feasible mechanism has to satisfy the individual rationality constraint (IR):
and the incentive compatibility constraint (IC):
With endogenous information acquisition, a feasible mechanism also has to satisfy the information acquisition constraint (IA): no bidder has an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium choice α * i :
and a vector of information choices (α * 1 , ..., α * n ) to maximize her expected sum of payment from all bidders,
subject to (IA), (IC), and (IR).
Information Order
In order to analyze a model with general information structures, we need an information order to rank the informativeness of different signals. Since the relevant variable for screening is the posterior estimate v i and there is one-to-one mapping between the information choice α i and the distribution H α i of v i , we would like to have an information order that directly ranks H α i . The rotation order, recently introduced by Johnson and Myatt (2006) , meets this requirement.
Definition 1 (Rotation Order)
The family of distributions {H α i } is rotation-ordered if, for every α i , there exists a rotation point
Two distributions ordered in terms of rotation cross only once: the distribution with lower α i crosses the distribution with higher α i from below. As shown below, the rotation order implies second-order stochastic dominance. However, the reverse is not true: two distributions ordered in terms of second-order stochastic dominance can cross each other more than once.
Lemma 1 (Rotation Order Implies Second Order Stochastic Dominance)
If a family of distributions {H α i } is rotation-ordered and they all have the same mean, then they are also ordered in terms of second-order stochastic dominance.
Proof. See Theorem 2.A.17 in Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994) .
Following Blackwell (1953) , we say that one signal is more informative than the other if a decision-maker can achieve a higher expected utility when basing a decision on the realization of the more informative signal. We extend Blackwell's information criterion to our multi-agent setting by applying his criterion to each bidder while fixing other bidders' information choices.
Proposition 1 (Rotation Order and Blackwell's Criterion)
Suppose that {H α i } is rotation-ordered and
that is incentive compatible, bidder i achieves a higher expected payoff with information choice α i than information choice α i .
The above result is intuitive. Because the bidder i's interim payoff u (v i ) is convex in v i under any incentive compatible mechanism (Rochet (1987) ), and because H α i second-order stochastic dominates H α i (by Lemma 1), bidder i's expected payoff is higher under the more risky prospect H α i . Therefore, if {H α } is rotation-ordered and α i > α i , then a signal with α i is indeed more informative than a signal with α i because α i corresponds to a higher expected payoff for bidder i.
Optimal Auctions with One Bidder and Gaussian Specification
We start with a simple model with one buyer. If the buyer's information is exogenous, Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) show that the optimal selling mechanism is to post a non-negotiable price. With endogenous information, their logic still applies and a posted price is optimal. 19 Therefore, we can also reinterpret the seller's optimization problem as a monopoly pricing problem with endogenous information.
19
The one-bidder model is a special case of the general model we study later. As shown in the next section, after incorporating the information acquisition constraint, the seller's objective function will be the Lagrangian specified in (10). If there is only one bidder, it reduces to a simple form similar to the one analyzed in Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) . Therefore, their proof of the optimality of the posted price mechanism still applies here.
We first examine the buyer's information decision and show that the marginal value of information to the buyer increases as the reserve price (or monopoly price) moves toward the mean valuation. Then we analyze the seller's information preferences and demonstrate that the seller would prefer a more informed buyer if and only if the monopoly price is above the mean valuation.
The above two observations lead to the main result of this section: the optimal monopoly price with endogenous information is always lower than the standard monopoly price with exogenous information.
For the purposes of illustration, we focus on a special but important rotation-ordered information structure: the Gaussian specification, though it is straightforward to extend the analysis to general rotation-ordered information structures.
Gaussian Specification
The buyer's true valuations ω i are drawn from a normal distribution with mean µ and precision β :
Lowering β has the consequence that the prior distribution becomes more spread out, yielding more potential gains from information acquisition.
The buyer can observe a costly signal s i :
where the additive error ε i is independent of ω i , and ε i ∼ N (0, 1/α i ) . The higher is the α i , the more precise is the signal. Thus we interpret α i as the informativeness (precision) of the buyer's signal. α i is assumed to have two parts:
The first part, α, is the endowed signal precision; the second term γ i is the additional precision obtained by investing in information acquisition. For illustration purposes, the cost of information is assumed to be linear in the incremental precision. That is,
where c is the constant marginal cost of one additional unit of precision.
After observing a signal s i with precision α i , the buyer updates his belief of ω i . By the standard normal updating technique, the posterior valuation distribution conditional on the signal s i will be normal:
It immediately follows that
Thus the distribution of the posterior estimate v i , H α i (v i ) , is normal:
Note that the variance of v i is increasing in the information choice α i . So the distribution H α i will be more spread out for a more precise signal. The following two graphs capture the relationship between two distributions of the posterior estimate with different information choices. The left graph in Figure 2 shows that the density of the posterior estimate with a more informative signal is more dispersed than the one with a less informative signal. The right graph shows that the distribution with a less informative signal crosses the distribution with a more informative one from below at the mean valuation. With some algebra, we can show
Therefore, {H α i } are rotation-ordered and the rotation point v + α i = µ for all α i .
Marginal Value of Information to the Buyer
This subsection will illustrate the following important observation: the marginal value of information to the buyer increases as the reserve price r moves toward the mean valuation µ. This observation is the key driving force of our later analysis. We will generalize it to a setting with multiple buyers in Section 5.
For a given reserve price r, the buyer chooses α i to maximize his expected payoff:
The above equation follows from the integration by part and some limit arguments. The marginal value of information (MVI) to the buyer is given by
The following proposition shows how the marginal value of information to the buyer varies with respect to the reserve price.
Proposition 2 (Marginal Value of Information to the Buyer)
The marginal value of information to the buyer increases as the reserve price r moves toward the mean valuation µ, and achieves maximum at r = µ.
Proof. With some algebra, we can show that
Therefore, as r → µ, M V I increases.
This observation is crucial in understanding the results obtained in this paper. To understand it better, consider a discrete version of the marginal value of information with two information choices α i and α i (α i > α i ). The buyer's gain from having signal α i rather than α i is
Exploiting the fact that the two distributions share the same mean (µ) and are symmetric with respect to µ, we can manipulate expression (4) into
The following two graphs illustrate the buyer's gain from more information. Given the reserve price r, the payoff of the buyer with signal α i is the area above the distribution H α i but below one and to the right of reserve price r. When r ≥ µ, the buyer's relative gain with signal α i rather than α i is the shaded area in the left graph (see also expression (4)). On the other hand, when r ≤ µ, according to expression (5), the buyer's gain from more information is the shaded area in the right graph. In both cases, the shaded area expands as r moves toward µ and achieves maximum at the mean valuation. Under mild conditions, the buyer's expected payoff is an increasing concave function of α i . Hence, the solution to the buyer's maximization problem will be unique, and the buyer's information choice will be decreasing in the information cost c (see Proposition 4 below).
Seller's Pricing Decision
For the seller, she chooses r and equilibrium α * to maximize her revenue. That is
The buyer's (agent) information choice is unobservable to the seller (principal), and the seller sets r to align the buyer's incentives to her own. Thus, we can interpret it as a principal-agent problem.
The standard way to solve this problem, the so-called first-order approach, is to assume that the second-order condition of the agent's maximization problem is satisfied, and use the first-order condition to replace the incentive constraint. We will assume the second-order condition is satisfied for now, and discuss it in detail at the end of this subsection.
Then, we can replace the buyer's optimization problem with the first-order condition, and rewrite the seller's optimization problem as 21
Let λ be the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint. We write the Lagrangian in a way such that a positive value of λ means that the seller benefits from a reduction in the information cost; in other words, the seller prefers a more informed buyer.
Lemma 2
For a fixed reserve price r, the seller's revenue increases in α * if and only if r > µ, and the seller's revenue decreases in α * if and only if r < µ.
Proof. Immediate from the definition of the seller's revenue and property (2) of the Gaussian specification.
The intuition for this result is straightforward by looking at Figure 3 . Suppose the buyer's information choice increases from α i to α i . If r > µ (left figure), then more information increases the probability of trade from (1 − H α i (r)) to (1 − H α i (r)). More information will therefore benefit the seller. In contrast, if r < µ (right figure), more information decreases the probability of trade
, so more information will hurt the seller.
If we reinterpret our model as a monopoly pricing problem with a continuum of consumers, then this result links to the main findings in Johnson and Myatt (2006) . To see this, we classify all markets into either niche markets or mass markets following Bergemann and Välimäki (2006b) , and Johnson and Myatt (2006) :
Definition 2 (Niche Market and Mass Market)
A market is said to be a niche (mass) market if the monopoly price is higher (lower) than the mean valuation µ.
Therefore, the lemma states that the monopolist would prefer better informed consumers if she is in a niche market. In contrast, the monopolist in a mass market will prefer not well-informed consumers. This result immediately leads to the key insight in Johnson and Myatt (2006) : if information is free, then a seller in the niche (mass) market will provide the maximal (minimal) amount information to consumers to maintain its niche (mass) position.
21 To simplify notation, in what follows, we will use
standard reserve price when information is endowed rather than acquired.
Definition 3 (Standard Reserve Price)
The standard reserve price r α is the optimal reserve price when the buyer's signal α is exogenous.
That is
In particular, we will denote r α as the standard reserve price when no additional information (other than the endowed signal α) is acquired. Since normal distributions have an increasing hazard rate, r α is uniquely defined for each H α . The seller's optimal pricing rule can thus be stated as follows: 22
Proposition 3 (Optimal Reserve Price)
For a fixed β, there exists a µ such that
Therefore, the optimal reserve price r * with endogenous information is always (weakly) lower than the standard reserve price r α * .
In order to understand the seller's optimal pricing strategy, we can decompose the effect of a price increase on the seller's profits in three parts:
First, the seller's profits increase given that a trade is made (term A). Second, for a fixed information choice, a price increase will reduce the probability of trade (term B). Third, with endogenous information acquisition, a price increase will affect the buyer's incentive to acquire information, thereby the probability of trade (term C). The first two terms are standard, while the last one is specific to the setting with endogenous information acquisition.
If r * > µ, ∂H α * (r * ) /∂α * < 0 by (2), and an increase in r discourages information acquisition:
∂α * /∂r < 0, so term C is negative. If r * < µ, ∂H α * (r * ) /∂α * > 0 by (2), and the incentives to 22 We use rα * as our benchmark for two reasons. First, the comparison between r * and rα * captures the exact effect of endogenous information on mechanism choices, which is the main focus of this paper. Second, results based on rα * are cleaner and more robust with respect to distribution assumptions, compared to results based on other benchmarks, such as rα and rα.
gather information are higher for a higher r: ∂α * /∂r > 0. Again, term C is negative. Therefore, for r * = µ, the marginal gain to the seller from raising price r here is always smaller than the gain in a setting with exogenous information. As a result, the seller will charge a lower price: r * < r α * .
For r * = µ, a marginal increase in price does not affect buyer's incentive to acquire information, so r * = r α * .
We conclude this subsection by presenting sufficient conditions for the second-order condition of the buyer's maximization problem to be satisfied. Under these conditions, the first-order approach is valid and the buyer's expected payoff is globally concave in the information choice α i .
Proposition 4 (Validity of the First Order Approach)
If r ∈ [µ − 2σ (α) , µ + 2σ (α)] and α ≥ β, the second-order condition of the buyer's maximization problem is satisfied.
These conditions are stronger than necessary and are not very restrictive. Note that more than 95% of the normal density is within two standard deviations of the mean. Thus, the first condition is to ensure that the probability of trade under r will be higher than 2.5% but lower than 97.5%.
In other words, the reserve price r is neither extremely high nor extremely low ensuring that the probability of trade is neither close to 1 nor close to 0. The second condition α ≥ β is to ensure
It requires that signals be informative relative to the prior.
Optimal Auctions with Many Bidders
In the single-bidder model, the strategic interaction among bidders is absent, so the simple posted price mechanism is optimal. This section studies optimal auctions with many bidders and rotationordered information structures, and shows that most of the insights from the previous section carry through. Specifically, we show that: 1) A bidder's incentives to acquire information increase as the reserve price moves toward the rotation point; 2) If we restrict attention to the symmetric mechanism that induces all bidders to acquire the same level of information, standard auctions with an adjusted reserve price are optimal; 3) If information decision is discrete, then the optimal selling mechanism reduces the level of price discrimination against (stochastically) strong bidders compared to the case with exogenous information; 4) We derive a necessary and sufficient condition under which the bidders' incentives to acquire information are socially excessive in standard auctions.
One insight that cannot be carried over from the one-bidder case, however, concerns the seller's information preferences. If there are sufficiently many bidders, the seller will encourage information 23 Under this condition, the equilibrium information level is away from zero. Therefore, we can avoid the nonconcavity of the value of information identified in Radner and Stiglitz (1984) .
acquisition -even when the standard reserve price is lower than the mean valuation (rotation point). We show that, in many cases, the seller will prefer that bidders acquire more information, as long as the number of bidders is large.
Marginal Value of Information to the Buyer
As stated in Section 3, the seller's optimization problem is to choose a menu
and a vector of information choices (α * 1 , α * 2 , ..., α * n ) to maximize her revenue subject to (IC) (IR) and (IA) constraints.
It is well-known (Myerson (1981) , and Rochet (1987) ) that the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) is equivalent to the following two conditions:
and
With equation (6), we can write the individual rationality constraint (IR) simply as u i (ω) ≥ 0.
The information acquisition constraint (IA) requires that α * i be bidder i's best response given that other bidders chooses α
The subscript α * −i of the expectation operator is to remind the readers that the expectation depends on the information choice α * −i of bidder i's opponents. The subscript α i in the lower and upper limits (ω α i , ω α i ) is to emphasize the fact that the support of the posterior estimates may depend on the information choice α i . The first-order condition is
Let r i denote the personalized reserve price for bidder i in the optimal auction. That is, if bidder i is allocated the object with positive probability, then his posterior estimate is at least r i :
The marginal value of information to bidder i with reserve price r i is
Theorem 1 (Marginal Value of Information to a Buyer)
The marginal value of information to a buyer increases as r i moves toward the rotation point v + α i if and only if signals are rotation-ordered.
Proof. Sufficiency. Notice that
Rotation order implies that
Suppose signals are not rotation-ordered. Then the two distributions associated with two different α i 's must cross at least twice. Without loss of generality, suppose the other crossing points is lower than v + α i . Then we can find a r i < v + α i such that
Thus, MVI decreases as r i moves toward v + α i by (9), a contradiction. Theorem 1 generalizes Proposition 2 to a setting with many bidders and rotation-ordered information structures. Therefore, if a seller wants to induce buyer i to acquire more information, she should set the reserve price r i closer to the rotation point v + α i .
Characterization of Symmetric Optimal Auctions
In order to characterize optimal auctions, we need to simplify the (IA) constraints. If the first-order approach is valid, we can replace bidder i's optimization problem by (8). It is valid if the secondorder condition of bidders' optimization problem is satisfied, which we will assume for now and relegate detailed discussions to Subsection 5.5. In principle, the equilibrium information choices could be different: α * i = α * j , for i = j, so there will be a system of n first-order conditions: one for each bidder.
We use Lagrangian approach to incorporate the n first-order conditions. As in the standard moral hazard model, the main difficulty lies in the determination of the sign of the Lagrange multiplier of these first-order conditions (Rogerson (1985) ). The seller's maximization problem here, however, is substantially more complicated in three ways. First, we have n agents and n firstorder conditions. Second, unlike in the standard moral hazard model where higher effort always benefits the principal if it is costless to induce effort, more information here may hurt the seller, as we can see from Lemma 2. Finally, the seller has to give bidders not only incentives to acquire information, but also incentives to tell the truth, i.e., our model is a mixed model with moral hazard and adverse selection. As such, some restrictions on the model are necessary in order to characterize the optimal selling mechanism.
In this subsection, we restrict our attention to symmetric mechanisms with α * 1 = · · · = α * n = α * . This restriction helps reduce the system of first-order conditions to a single equation (8). 24 Replacing the incentive constraint by equation (6) and (7), and replacing the (IA) constraint by (8), we can transform the seller's optimization problem from the allocation-transfer space into the allocation-utility space:
It is easy to see that the (IR) constraint must be binding. For now we ignore the regularity constraint and the monotonicity constraint, and verify them later. Then the only remaining constraint is the (IA) constraint. Let λ denote the Lagrange multiplier for the (IA) constraint, and write the Lagrangian for the seller's maximization problem as
Then a positive λ implies that the seller's revenue increases as the marginal cost of information decreases. The virtual surplus function J * (v i ) can be defined as
In order to characterize the optimal solution to the seller's optimization problem, we make the following assumptions:
24 A sufficient condition for the existence of a symmetric equilibrium is that there exists a α * satisfying both the firstorder condition and the second-order condition of the buyer's maximization problem. If we assume limα→α C (α) = 0, and limα→α C (α) = κ (where κ is a large positive number), then there must exist a α * satisfies the first-order condition (8). If the cost function is sufficiently convex, that is, C (α) is sufficient large, then the second-order condition is satisfied. A quadradic cost function C (α) = κ0 (α − α) 2 with large κ0 meets all the requirements.
Assumption 1 (Rotation Order)
The family of distributions of the posterior estimates, {H α i } , is rotation-ordered and the rotation point is µ for all α i .
Assumption 2 (Monotonicity)
is increasing in v i for all α i and v i ∈ ω α i , ω α i .
Assumption 3 (Regularity)
Assumption 1 assumes that the signals are rotation-ordered and the rotation point v + α i is µ for all α i . The assumption v + α i = µ is not critical, but it greatly eases our presentation. We will discuss it later. Assumption 2 is stronger than the rotation order assumption, and it says that the expected gain from more information is higher for the buyers with higher v i . 25 Finally, Assumption 3 is a regularity assumption.
Both the rotation order assumption and the regularity assumption are mild assumptions. The monotonicity assumption is relatively more restrictive, but two commonly used information technologies in the literature, the Gaussian specification and the truth-or-noise technology (Lewis and Sappington (1994) ), satisfy all three assumptions.
Definition 4 (Truth-or-noise Technology)
The buyers' true valuations {ω i } are independently drawn from a distribution F, and F has an increasing hazard rate. Buyer i can acquire a costly signal s i about ω i . With probability α i ∈ [α, 1] , the signal s i perfectly matches the true valuation ω i , and with probability 1 − α i , s i is a noise independently drawn from F.
Under the truth-or-noise specification, the signal s i sometimes perfectly reveals buyer i's valuation ω i , but is noise otherwise.
Lemma 3 (All Assumptions Hold for the Two Leading Examples)
Both the Gaussian specification and the truth-or-noise technology generate a family of distributions {H α i } that satisfies Assumptions 1, 2, and 3.
25 Indeed, the monotonicity assumption, together with the mean-preserving property of our information structures, implies rotation order. To see this, first note that
cannot always be positive or negative, otherwise it will imply first order stochastic dominance which violates the fact that the family of distributions {Hα i } have the same mean. Therefore, if monotonicity assumption holds,
must change sign from positive to negative only once.
That is, {Hα i } is rotation ordered.
Note that Assumption 1 does not imply that the underlying distribution F is symmetric. For example, for the truth-or-noise technology, the underlying distribution F could be convex or concave, but the rotation point is still µ.
In order to characterize the symmetric optimal auction, we first need to identify the seller's information preferences, that is, the sign of the Lagrange multiplier λ for the (IA) constraint. It turns out that this is the most difficult part of the analysis. We use the technique in Rogerson (1985) to sign λ: we relax the (IA) constraint to an inequality constraint, characterize the optimal solution of the relaxed problem, and then verify that (IA) constraint is binding in the optimal solution under the set of conditions in Lemma 4 below.
Lemma 4
Suppose the first-order approach is valid. The seller benefits from a reduction of marginal cost (λ > 0), when either one of the following two sets of conditions is satisfied:
(1) Assumptions 1-3 hold and r α > µ.
(2) The Gaussian specification or the truth-or-noise technology, and large n.
The first condition implies r * > µ, which is sufficient for λ > 0. Recall that, in the case of one bidder, the seller prefers more information if r * > µ. An increase in the number of bidders only strengthens the seller's preference for more information. The second condition should be contrasted with Lemma 2 in the case of one bidder. The strategic interaction between buyers, which is absent in the one-bidder model, plays a crucial part here. To see this, note that the seller's revenue is determined by the valuation of the marginal bidder (for example, the second highest bidder) and the reserve price. With many bidders, the valuation of the marginal bidder will be higher than the mean valuation. This valuation is likely to be higher when more information is acquired. In the case with one bidder, however, a seller will prefer a more informed buyer only when the optimal reserve price is higher than the mean valuation (niche market). Now, we can present a simple rule for adjusting the reserve price in optimal auctions with information acquisition: 26
Theorem 2 (Simple Rule for Adjusting the Reserve Price)
Suppose the first-order approach is valid, Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. If λ > 0, then the optimal 26 The next two theorems will characterize the optimal selling mechanism contingent on the sign of the endogenous Lagrangian multiplier λ. With Lemma 4, we can always restate the theorems by replacing the condition λ > 0 by the exogenous condition (1) or (2). However, since both condition (1) and (2) are not necessary for λ > 0, we state our theorems in terms of the sign of λ.
reserve price r * is closer to the mean valuation µ than the standard reserve price r α * . Specifically,
Theorem 2 is conceptually a direct consequence of Theorem 1. At first glance, this theorem appears to be inconsistent with Proposition 3. Proposition 3 shows that with a single buyer r * ≤ r α * for all parameter values, while here with multiple buyers the optimal reserve price r * could be higher than the standard reserve price r α * . The resulting difference is due to the fact that the seller may change her information preference as the number of buyers increases. In the setting with single buyer, the seller would prefer a more informed buyer if and only if r α * > µ. But in a setting with many buyers, the seller may prefer a more informed buyer even when r α * < µ, because what matters for the seller is the distribution of the second order statistic rather than the distribution of individual bidders' valuation. As the number of bidders increases, the expectation of the second order statistic likely increases as the posterior distribution becomes more spread out. Now in order to encourage information acquisition, the seller has to set r * between r α * and µ, leading to r α * < r * .
This result is important in practice when the seller is concerned about bidders' incentives to acquire information. The reserve price is always the most important decision she has to make other than choosing the auction format. Theorem 2 identifies a simple rule to adjust the reserve price when endogenous information acquisition is important.
This result also has important implication for empirical studies. The empirical auction literature has attempted to evaluate the optimality of a seller's reserve price policy. Most of these studies assume exogenous information and do not consider the bidders' incentives to acquire information. They use observed bids and the equilibrium bidding behavior to recover the distribution of bidders' valuations, and then compare the actual reserve price with the standard reserve price calculated from the estimated distribution. Our results indicate that, in situations where information acquisition is important, the standard reserve price may not be an appropriate benchmark for
comparison.
The next result shows that under the stronger Assumption 2, standard auctions with an appropriately chosen reserve price are optimal.
Theorem 3 (Optimal Auctions)
Suppose the first-order approach is valid, Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold, and λ > 0. Then standard auctions with the reserve price r * adjusted according to Theorem 2 are optimal.
An immediate consequence of Theorem 3 is the revenue equivalence among all standard auctions, because the allocation rule is the same across all standard auctions. Furthermore, since the bidders' expected gain from information acquisition is the same for all standard auctions, the equilibrium amount of information acquired is the same across standard auctions as well.
The restriction of symmetric equilibrium is important for the above result. If bidders are allowed to acquire different levels of information in equilibrium, the revenue equivalence theorem fails. If we assume that information acquisition is discrete rather than continuous, however, we can characterize the optimal selling mechanism without the symmetric restriction, as shown in the following subsection.
Asymmetric Mechanisms with Discrete Information Acquisition
In this subsection, we assume information acquisition is discrete, so we can drop both the symmetric restriction and the first-order approach. Specifically, bidders are assumed to be ex ante symmetric and endowed with signal with precision α 0 . Each bidder can opt to receive a signal α 1 that is more informative than signal α 0 in terms of rotation order, but he has to incur a cost c. The distribution of bidder i's posterior estimates v i is denoted by H 0 (·) if he does not acquire information, and H 1 (·) if he acquires information. Let h 0 and h 1 denote the corresponding densities.
By revelation principle, we can restrict to the direct revelation mechanism {q i (v) , t i (v)} . Without loss of generality, suppose the seller wants to induce first m bidders (0 ≤ m ≤ n) to acquire additional information. Then the mechanism must satisfy the standard (IC), (IR) constraints,
and information acquisition (IA) constraints:
That is, the mechanism has to ensure that the first m bidders have incentives to acquire information and the remaining (n − m) bidders have incentives not to acquire information.
Let λ i denote the Lagrange multiplier of the information acquisition constraint for bidder i, i = 1, ..., n. Then the Lagrangian can be written and simplified as
Consider two bidders, i and j: bidder i acquires information and bidder j does not. Then the distributions of the posterior estimates of bidder i and j are H 1 and H 0 , respectively. Let r 0 and r 1 solve
Since information structures are rotation-ordered,
where v + is the rotation point. Therefore, conditional on the posterior estimate x > v + , informed bidder i is stochastically "stronger" than bidder j, but conditional on x < v + , uninformed bidder j is stochastically "stronger" than bidder i. Myerson (1981) demonstrates that the optimal auction should discriminate against "strong" bidders. Interestingly, endogenous information acquisition reduces the level of ex-post discrimination against "strong" bidders, as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 4 (Asymmetric Mechanism)
With endogenous information, the optimal reserve price for informed bidder i, r * i , lies between r 1 and v + , and the optimal reserve price for uninformed bidder j, r * j , is set such that r 0 is between r * j and v + . Moreover, the mechanism reduces the level of price discrimination against "strong" bidders if signals are rotation-ordered.
Proof. The proof of the first part is identical to the proof of Theorem 2. For the second part, notice that the difference between the virtual surplus functions for bidder i and bidder j is:
Since λ i , λ j ≥ 0,
Thus, compared to the case with exogenous information, informed bidder i is treated more favorably if the winning bid is higher than v + , and uninformed bidder j is treated more favorably otherwise.
In both cases, endogenous information acquisition reduces price discrimination against "strong"
bidders.
The first part of the theorem shows that the optimal rule for adjusting reserve price identified in Theorem 2 is still valid in this discrete setting. The seller would set the optimal reserve price closer to the rotation point in order give bidder i incentives to acquire information. The second part suggests that the seller would soften price discrimination in order to provide bidders with appropriate incentives either to or not to acquire information.
Informational Efficiency
Theorem 3 states that standard auctions with an adjusted reserve price are optimal when we restrict the equilibrium to be symmetric. This subsection will examine the informational efficiency of standard auctions and obtain a slightly more general results that can apply to optimal symmetric auctions.
We use a symmetric benchmark in which the social optimal information choice α F B is the same for all bidders. For all i :
At information level α i , the marginal value of information to the social planner is
Recall that, at information level α i , the marginal value of information to the bidder i is
Since the social planner has to pay n times the individual information cost, we normalize the social value of information by multiplying 1/n. The difference between the social and individual gain from acquiring information is
By definition of rotation order, if r < µ, ∆ (α i , n) < 0. That is, information acquisition in auctions with r < µ is socially excessive. Thus, we have proved the following result.
Proposition 5 (Informational Efficiency)
Suppose Assumption 1 holds. There exists δ > 0 such that bidders have socially excessive incentives to acquire information in standard auctions if and only if r < µ + δ.
When r = 0, the bidders' incentive to acquire information coincides with the social optimum, which can be easily seen from equation (15). 27 As r increases, the buyers' incentive to acquire information increases, reaches maximum at r = µ, and declines afterwards. Consequently, there exists a δ > 0, such that the individual incentive to acquire information coincides with the social optimum when r = µ + δ. Therefore, the bidders' incentive to acquire information is socially excessive when r ∈ (0, µ + δ). For the one-bidder model with the Gaussian specification studied in Section 4, δ = µ.
Discussion
Rotation order. The rotation order ranks different information structures by comparing the distributions of the posterior estimates. In contrast, most existing information orders (for example, Lehmann (1988) and Athey and Levin (2001) First order approach. In an early version of this paper (Shi (2007) ), we provide several sets of sufficient conditions for the first-order approach to be valid. First, it is satisfied if the cost function is sufficiently convex. Second, if the support of H α i is invariant with respect to α i , then a condition analogous to the CDFC condition in the principal-agent literature (Mirrlees (1999) , and
Rogerson (1985)) is sufficient. Third, we present sufficient conditions for the case of the Gaussian specification and the truth-or-noise technology, respectively.
As pointed out in Bolton and Dewatripoint (2005) , the requirement that the bidders' first-order condition be necessary and sufficient is too strong. All we need is that the replacement of the (IA)
constraint by the first-order condition can generate necessary conditions for the seller's original maximization problem. Thus, our analysis may remain valid even when the second-order condition of the bidders' maximization problem fails.
Private value. Our model focuses on the independent private value framework, but it can be immediately extended to a setting with a common component. Suppose buyer i's true valuation θ i has two components:
The first term ω i represents the individual idiosyncratic valuation and is unknown ex-ante. Buyer i can acquire costly information about ω i . The second term y is the common value component, and both the buyers and the seller learn it for free. 28 In this setting, all our analysis remain valid because the common component only shifts the distribution but does not affect the buyers' incentives.
Pre-auction investment. Finally, our model framework can easily modified to analyze preauction investment that stochastically shifts bidders' valuation upwards. 29
Conclusion
The mechanism design literature studies how carefully designed mechanisms can be used to elicit agents' private information in order to achieve a desired goal. Most of the papers in the literature, however, ignore the influence of the proposed mechanisms on agents' incentives to gather information. In particular, with endogenous information acquisition, the optimal selling mechanism should take into account the bidders' information decision as a response to the proposed mechanism. We show that under some conditions standard auctions with a reserve price remain optimal but the reserve price has to be adjusted in order to incorporate the buyers' incentives to acquire information.
Relative to the existing literature, our model has three distinctive features. First, we study the optimal mechanism that maximizes revenue in the presence of information acquisition. This distinguishes our model from papers studying information acquisition in fixed auction formats.
Second, we study private and decentralized information acquisition, thus differing from previous studies on the seller's optimal disclosure policy and various entry models. Finally, the information structure required for our results is more general than most of the existing literature on mechanism design: we require only that the distributions of the posterior estimates be rotation-ordered.
28 For example, a firm typically has two types of assets: liquid and illiquid. All potential buyers of the firm may agree on the value liquid assets reflected in the financial statement, but they may value the illiquid assets differently. 29 See Obara (2007) for an analysis of optimal auctions with hidden actions and correlated signals.
Proof of Proposition 1: Under mechanism
(information rent) with information structure α i and α i are, respectively 30
Therefore,
where
Proof of Proposition 3:
We have already showed in the text that
To complete the proof, we only need to show that for a fixed β, there exists a µ such that
Note that the first-order condition for the buyer's maximization problem as
Applying implicit function theorem to (17), we can show that ∂α ∂r
30 If the support of the posterior estimates varies with respect to information choice αi, we can redefine the distribution as follows. Suppose under information structure αi, the support is ω α i , ωα i . Then define Hα i (vi) = 0 for vi ∈ ω, ω α i and Hα i (vi) = 1 for vi ∈ [ωα i , ω] .
We can also write the necessary first-order condition the seller's maximization problem as
Define the function Γ (r * , µ) as
Then applying implicit function theorem to Γ (r * , µ) = 0, we have
Given (18), it is straightforward to show that for r * > µ : ∂Γ (r * , µ) ∂µ > 0, ∂Γ (r * , µ) ∂r < 0, and
Therefore, for r * > µ, As a result, there must exists a unique µ such that r * ( µ) = µ. Moreover,
Now the proposition follows from (16) and (20).
Proof of Proposition 4:
The second-order condition for the buyer's optimization problem is
With some algebra, we can show
Therefore, we can rewrite the second-order condition as
By a change of variable with y =
The inequality (21) can be simplified into
Substitute the expression of k and x and we can obtain
Therefore, a sufficient condition for (22) is
which is equivalent to α i > 3β/4. Since α i > α for all i, the second-order condition is satisfied whenever α > β. Hence, the first-order approach is valid if r ∈ [µ − 2σ (α) , µ + 2σ (α)] and α > β.
Proof of Lemma 3:
For the Gaussian specification, we know from the text that
Since H α is normal, it has an increasing hazard rate and the regularity assumption is satisfied.
Recall equation (3)
.
In addition,
It is easy to see that the other two assumptions are satisfied as well.
For the truth-or-noise technology, a buyer who observes a realization s i with precision α i will revise his posterior estimate as follows:
The distribution and density of the posterior estimate are, respectively
Simple calculations lead to
Equation (23) shows that the family of distributions {H α i (·)} is rotation-ordered with rotation point equal to µ. The monotonicity assumption follows from equation (24). Finally, H α i (·) has an increasing hazard rate, because, by assumption, the underlying distribution F (·) has an increasing hazard rate. Therefore, the family of distributions {H α i (·)} generated by the "truth-or-noise" technology satisfies all assumptions.
Proof of Lemma 4: Let α * denote the equilibrium information choice of bidders in the symmetric equilibrium. We prove the lemma by establishing the following two claims.
Claim 1: The seller's revenue in standard auctions with reserve price r is increasing in α * if (1) r ≥ µ; or (2) Gaussian specification or truth-or-noise information technology, and n is large.
Claim 2: If the seller's revenue is increasing in α * in standard auctions with reserve price r, then λ > 0.
Proof of Claim 1: Let V k,n denote the k-th order statistic from n random variables independently drawn from H α * . The seller's revenue in standard auctions with a reserve price r is:
π s (α * , r) = r Pr (V n−1,n < r ≤ V n,n ) + E [V n−1,n |V n−1,n ≥ r] Pr (V n−1,n ≥ r) = r [H n−1,n (r) − H n,n (r)] + 
:
Note that the expectation term is independent of u (ω) , and u (ω) is nonnegative, so the (IR) constraint must be binding. Ignore the regularity constraint and monotonicity constraint for the moment.
We adopt the same strategy of Rogerson (1985) by weakening the equality (IA) constraint to the following inequality constraint.
With the inequality constraint, the corresponding Lagrange multiplier λ is always nonnegative. If we can show that λ > 0 at the optimal solution of the relaxed program, then the constraint is binding in equilibrium. Then, the optimal solution of relaxed program is also an optimal solution of the original program. Hence λ > 0 for the original program.
We can write and simplify the Lagrangian for the relaxed program as
The necessary first-order condition is
Since λ ≥ 0, standard auctions are optimal by Theorem 3. Therefore, we can restrict attention to standard auctions, and the seller's revenue in standard auctions is
By assumption, the seller's revenue is increasing in α * , so the first term in the big bracket of (26) is positive. In order to show λ > 0, we need to show that the second term is negative. Note that in a standard auction with reserve price r,
Thus,
Since α * maximize a bidder's expected payoff, the local second-order condition of the bidder's maximization problem holds. As a result, term A is negative. Since term B is also negative, the partial derivative is negative. Therefore, λ > 0 at the optimal solution (α * , q * ) . The solution to the relaxed program is the same as the one for the original program, and the maximum of the relaxed program can be achieved by the original program. Hence, the Lagrange multiplier λ for the original problem must be strictly positive.
To complete the proof, we need to show that r α > µ implies r α * > µ. Note that by definition of r α and Assumption 3, r α > µ is equivalent to
Since α * ≥ α, by Assumption 1, H α (µ) = H α * (µ) and h α (µ) ≥ h α * (µ)
It follows that
Thus, r α * > µ. Finally, from Theorem 2, for λ > 0, r α * > µ ⇔ r * ≥ µ.
The Lemma now follows from Claim 1 and Claim 2.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Recall the virtual surplus function is
The optimal reserve price r * has to satisfy
and r * ≤ min {r : J * (v i ) ≥ 0 for all v i ≥ r} .
Thus, r * ≤ µ. As a result, r α * < r ≤ µ.
Case 4: λ < 0 and r α * < µ. Note that for all v i ∈ [r α * , µ]
In addition, r * cannot be higher than µ, otherwise λ > 0. Therefore, r * < r α * < µ.
From the proof of Lemma 4, we know r α * ≥ µ implies λ > 0, the above four cases include all possible cases, and our proof is complete.
Proof of Theorem 3: Under Assumption 2 and 3,
is increasing in v i . In this case, we can define the reserve price as r * = inf {r : J * (r) ≥ 0} .
Therefore the optimal auctions will assign the object to the bidder with highest posterior estimate provided his estimate is higher than r * . So standard auctions with reserve price r * are optimal, where r * is set according to Theorem 2.
